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The rising costs of health care have forced changes in institutions
that provide health care services to patients. Doctors, hospitals, insur-
ance companies, and drug manufacturers have changed business prac-
tices to trim costs and maximize profits. One practice exploited by
pharmaceutical companies is the freedom to advertise prescription
drug products.' Direct-to-consumer advertising can effectively in-
crease product sales by reaching potential consumers through print
and broadcast media.2
Direct-to-consumer advertising has prompted considerable legal
comment regarding the liability of drug manufacturers to the ultimate
consumer, the patient.' Unlike makers of nonpharmaceutical prod-
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1. Pharmaceutical manufacturers spent an estimated $1 billion on direct-to-consumer
advertising in 1997. Kelly N. Reeves, Open Forum, Direct-to-Consumer Broadcast Advertising:
Empowering the Consumer or Manipulating a Vulnerable Population, 53 FOOD & DRUG L. J., 661,
662 n.11 (1998). In 1998, spending by drug manufacturers on print and broadcast advertising
increased to $1.3 billion. Perez v. Wyeth Laboratories, Inc., 734 A.2d 1245, 1252 (N.J. 1999)
(quoting Robert Pear, Drug Companies Getting F.D.A. Reprimands for False or Misleading Adver-
tising, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 28, 1999, at 28).
2. See Jay P. Speivack, Direct Ads May Create Liability Dangers, NAT'L L. J., Mar. 15,
1999, at B7 n.1 (citing David Morrow, What We've Learned from Those Little Blue Pills, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 17, 1999, at G3, (writing that testimonials boosted worldwide sales for Viagra to
$788 million)).
3. See, e.g., Michael C. Allen, Medicine Goes Madison Avenue: An Evaluation of the Effect
of Direct-to-Consumer Pharmaceutical Advertising on the Learned Intermediary Doctrine, 20
CAMPBELL L. REV. 113 (1997); Lars Noah, Advertising Prescription Drugs to Consumers: Assess-
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ucts, a drug manufacturer does not have a duty to warn a consumer 4 of
the risks associated with a drug, rather, it owes a duty to warn the
prescribing physician.' The physician is recognized as a learned inter-
mediary between the drug manufacturer and the consumer.6 As a
result, the drug manufacturer is shielded from direct liability in failure
to warn cases because the physician has the requisite skill to under-
stand the risks described by the drug manufacturer, and the physician
knows the health status of the patient far better than the manufacturer
does.
Courts are reexamining policies supporting the learned intermed-
iary doctrine in view of direct-to-consumer advertising by pharmaceu-
tical companies. In a recent decision, the New Jersey Supreme Court
advocated that when a manufacturer's advertisement misinforms a
patient's choice of therapy, the court should recognize an exception to
the learned intermediary rule. In a factually similar case, the Fifth
Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that it would not abandon the learned
intermediary doctrine.8
This Comment will explore whether Washington courts should
recognize direct-to-consumer advertising as an exception to the
learned intermediary rule. With the ultimate goal of advocating the
best protection for the consumer, the discussion will suggest that
Washington courts should not create an exception. A review of other
ing the Regulatory and Liability Issues, 32 GA. L. REv. 141 (1997); Reeves, supra note 1; Teresa
Moran Schwartz, Consumer- Directed Prescription Drug Advertising and the Learned Intermediary
Rule, 46 FOOD DRUG COSM. L. J. 829 (1991); Tamar V. Terzian, Note, Direct-to-Consumer
Prescription Drug Advertising, 25 AM. J. L. & MED. 149 (1999).
4. Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 161 A.2d 69 (N.J. 1960), is considered the leading
case in overturning the established law in torts that direct liability is found only if the parties are
in privity with one another. Courts rapidly followed the New Jersey decision, finding that an
implied warranty of safety applies to many different products. See W. PAGE KEETON ET AL.,
PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 97, at 690 (5th ed. 1984).
5. See Martin v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 661 N.E.2d 352, 357 (I11. 1996); Reaves v.
Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 765 F. Supp. 1287, 1291 (E.D. Mich. 1991); Terhune v. A.H.
Robins Co., 90 Wash. 2d 9, 18, 577 P.2d 975, 980 (1978). See also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 6(d)(2) (1998).
6. The term "learned intermediary" was first used in Sterling Drug, Inc. v. Cornish, 370
F.2d 82, 85 (8th Cir. 1966). The court distinguished a prescription drug from a normal con-
sumer item. "In such a case the purchaser's doctor is a learned intermediary between the
purchaser and the manufacturer." Id. If the doctor is warned of side effects, then injury to the
patient has an "excellent chance" of being avoided. Id.
7. Perez, 734 A.2d at 1245. The court stated that in the case of direct-to-consumer
advertising of drugs, "patients deprived of reliable medical information [should be allowed] to
establish that the misinformation was a substantial factor contributing to their use of a defective
pharmaceutical product." Id. at 1263.
8. In re Norplant Contraceptive Products Liability Litigation, 165 F.3d 374, 379 (5th Cir.
1999) (citing prior Texas case law that "as long as physician-patient relationships exist, the
learned intermediary doctrine applies").
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exceptions to the learned intermediary rule does not support abandon-
ing the doctrine when a drug company advertises its product directly
to consumers. Nevertheless, advertising does affect consumer pur-
chases and does influence consumer choices, and drug companies
should accept the responsibility to present balanced information. This
responsibility should encompass more than meeting the minimum
requirements for balanced advertising presently promulgated by the
Food and Drug Administration (FDA).
The following section of this Comment presents a brief back-
ground of the learned intermediary doctrine, which provides an excep-
tion to the general rule that a product manufacturer is directly liable to
a consumer of the product. Section III discusses decisions in which
courts have created exceptions to the learned intermediary rule (excep-
tions to the exception). Next, Section IV presents a brief summary of
the Washington court decisions that evaluate whether a pharmaceu-
tical manufacturer should be directly liable to a patient. Section V
discusses the role of the FDA and the weight courts give to the
defense that drug manufacturers complied with FDA regulations.
This section also presents the measures the FDA takes to regulate pre-
scription drug advertising, as well as the challenges to these measures.
Finally, Section VI reviews the recent court decision in Perez v. Wyeth
Laboratories,9 and the policies discussed therein regarding advertising
and the learned intermediary rule. In this last section, the author con-
cludes with a discussion of how health care product advertising
impacts consumers.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Prescription Drugs Are Unavoidably Unsafe Products
Section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts states that a
manufacturer should be held strictly liable if it sells a product that is
defective and as such presents an unreasonable danger to the user or
consumer. 10 Most states, including Washington, have adopted the
rule either by statute or by case law."
Comment k to section 402A suggests that prescription drugs
should be considered unavoidably unsafe products because these
9. 734 A.2d 1245 (N.J. 1999).
10. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A(1) at 347 (1965).
11. See Michael J. Wagner & Laura L. Peterson, The New Restatement (Third) of Torts-
Shelter from the Product Liability Storm for Pharmaceutical Companies and Medical Device Manu-
facturers?, 53 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 225, 226-27 n.9 (1998). The Washington Supreme Court
incorporated section 402A of the Restatement (Second) in its decision in Terhune. 90 Wash. 2d
at 12, 577 P.2d at 977.
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products are "quite incapable of being made safe for their intended
and ordinary use.' 2  Risks are inherent in taking most, if not all,
pharmaceutical drugs. A drug may provide benefit to some people,
yet the same drug may not be an appropriate treatment for others. For
example, aspirin, a readily available nonprescription drug, is recom-
mended for some patients to reduce the risk of heart attack. 3 Recog-
nition of this property of aspirin, i.e., its effect on blood clotting,
justifies its use by a particular population of patients with cardiovas-
cular disease. This same property, however, prompts physicians to
recommend another type of pain reliever for post-surgery patients. 4
Because most drugs pose some risk to some patients, drugs are con-
sidered unavoidably unsafe. Nevertheless, if a drug is not unreason-
ably unsafe or defective, then its benefit to many people justifies its
sale. 5 The manufacturer should not be held strictly liable because it
has supplied the public "with an apparently useful and desirable prod-
uct, attended with a known but apparently reasonable risk."' 6
Comment k of 402A was reorganized in the Restatement (Third)
of Torts: Product Liability. 7 If jurisdictions displace 402A with the
rules of the Restatement (Third), courts may change how they deter-
mine drug manufacturer liability. In the provision of the Restatement
(Third) that describes prescription drug manufacturing, design, and
12. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. k (1965). By way of illustration,
comment k discusses the rabies vaccine as an example of a pharmaceutical product that can lead
to damaging consequences, but rabies itself leads to a "dreadful death." Id. The comment con-
tinues, "[s]uch a product, properly prepared, and accompanied by proper directions and warn-
ing, is not defective, nor is it unreasonably dangerous." Id. The same is true of many other
drugs, vaccines, and the like, many of which for this very reason cannot legally be sold except to
physicians, or under the prescription of a physician. Id.
13. The American Heart Association recommends aspirin for patients who have experi-
enced a myocardial infarction (heart attack). Aspirin helps prevent blood clots, which lead to
strokes and heart attacks. The patient should consult a physician to ensure that he has no other
condition that would contraindicate regular intake of aspirin. American Heart Association,
Heart and Stroke A-Z Guide (last visited June 18, 2000) <http://www.americanheart.org/
Heart_and_Stroke_AZ guide/aspirin/html>.
14. If a person taking aspirin must undergo even a simple surgical procedure or dental
extraction, the surgeon or dentist must be told of the aspirin dosage. The tendency to bleed
persists for up to 10 days after aspirin use is stopped. See id.
15. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. k (1965). In the view of Wash-
ington courts, comment k focuses "on the product and its relative value to society." Young v.
Key Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 130 Wash. 2d 160, 169, 922 P.2d 59, 64 (1996). Some products are
necessary regardless of the risk they pose because the product may be necessary to sustain the life
of some individuals. If the drug were not available, the resulting harm would be greater to those
individuals than the harm risked by using the drug. Id. (quoting Rogers v. Miles Laboratories,
Inc., 116 Wash. 2d 195, 204, 802 P.2d 1346, 1351 (1991)).
16. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. k (1965).
17. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY (1998).
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warning defects,18 a prescription drug is no longer described as an una-
voidably unsafe product. Instead, the Restatement (Third) provides
A prescription drug or medical device is not reasonably safe due
to defective design if the foreseeable risks of harm posed by the
drug or medical device are sufficiently great in relation to its
foreseeable therapeutic benefits that reasonable health-care pro-
viders, knowing of such foreseeable risks and therapeutic bene-
fits, would not prescribe the drug or medical device for any class
of patients. 9
Commentators Michael Wagner and Laura Peterson note that
the "reasonable health care provider" standard departs from comment
k language, and they suggest it is a poorer test for judging the reasona-
bleness of marketing a particular drug or device than a "reasonable
manufacturer" standard.2" Wagner and Peterson contend that requir-
ing a physician to determine whether a product should be on the mar-
ket is "nonsensical."'" Consequently, this provision increases the risk
that the judiciary will reject the Restatement (Third).22 In the next
few years, pharmaceutical companies and attorneys will closely follow
whether, and to what extent, courts will follow the new restatement.
B. Duty to Warn
The Restatement (Second) advocates that a manufacturer should
be held strictly liable if the manufacturer introduces an unreasonably
unsafe product into the stream of commerce.23 A product may be con-
sidered unreasonably unsafe if it is placed in the hands of the ultimate
consumer without adequate warning of the dangers involved in the
product's use.24 Under comment k, the seller of prescription drugs is
not to be held strictly liable for "unfortunate consequences" attending
the use of unavoidably unsafe products provided that the products are
"properly prepared and marketed" and that "proper warning is
given."" To prevent inappropriate administration of a drug, the
manufacturer properly warns when it identifies the characteristics of
18. Id. § 6 (Liability of Commercial Seller or Distributor for Harm Caused by Defective
Prescription Drugs and Medical Devices).
19. Id. § 6(c).
20. Wagner & Peterson, supra note 11, at 233.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965).
24. Id.
25. Id. § 402A, cmt. k. Most courts have concluded that a prescription drug is unavoidably
unsafe if it meets the requirements of comment k. Allen v. G.D. Searle & Co., 708 F. Supp.
1142, 1149 (D. Or. 1989) (citing Coursen v. A. H. Robins Co., 764 F.2d 1329, 1338 (9th Cir.
1985)).
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patient populations that may be adversely affected by the drug and
discusses the consequent effects with those particular patients so that
harm may be prevented.26
In failure to warn cases, the majority of jurisdictions has applied
a negligence standard, a position also supported by the Restatement
(Third).27 The reporters for the Restatement (Third) reject the minor-
ity view that a company should be strictly liable for injuries caused by
a drug it manufactures, and instead focus on the reasonableness of the
manufacturer's conduct.2" A reasonable drug manufacturer is one that
knew or should have known about the risks of a prescription drug.29
To impose liability upon a manufacturer for failing to warn of scientif-
ically unknowable risks is unfair, inefficient, and impossible to insure
against.
30
C. The Learned Intermediary Rule-An Exception to a Manufacturer's
Duty to Warn Consumers
To establish a claim of negligence, a plaintiff must show that the
defendant had a duty to warn, the defendant breached that duty, and
the breach was the proximate cause of the plaintiff's injury.3 Gener-
ally, a manufacturer of a product can be held directly liable to a con-
sumer who is injured by the product. In drug liability cases, the
learned intermediary rule provides an exception to the duty owed by a
drug manufacturer to the consumer of a product, the patient.32 The
manufacturer meets its duty to warn of the dangers associated with a
drug when it provides adequate "precautionary information" to the
physician prescribing the medication.33 The physician, in turn, using
26. The FDA requires that all prescription drug labels have particular content and format.
The label must include a description of the drug, as well as information about clinical pharma-
cology, indications and usage, contraindications, warnings, precautions, adverse reactions, drug
abuse and dependence, overdosage, dosage and administration, and method of supply. 21
C.F.R. § 201.57 (2000).
27. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 6(d) (1998). See Wag-
ner & Peterson, supra note 11, at 234-35.
28. See Wagner & Peterson, supra note 11, at 234-35.
29. See id. at 234-35 and cases cited therein. See also James A. Henderson & Aaron D.
Twerski, Doctrinal Collapse in Products Liability: The Empty Shell of Failure to Warn, 65 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 265, 274 (1990).
30. See Henderson & Twerski, supra note 29, at 274 and notes therein.
31. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 4, at 164-65.
32. Sterling Drug, Inc. v. Cornish, 370 F.2d 82, 85 (8th Cir. 1966) (holding that because a
prescription drug is not a normal consumer item, the purchaser's doctor is a learned intermediary
between the purchaser and the manufacturer).
33. See, e.g., Lacy v. G.D. Searle & Co., 567 A.2d 398, 400 (Del. 1989) ("[I]f the manu-
facturer of prescription products provides the physician with the legally appropriate information,
it has satisfied its duty to warn."); Terhune, 90 Wash. 2d at 13, 577 P.2d at 977 (a "well-
established rule" is that the duty of a manufacturer to warn of dangers in use of a product is sat-
[Vol. 24:629
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his or her judgment, has a duty to convey relevant warnings to the
patient.3 4 The learned intermediary doctrine rests on the assumption
that the prescribing physician, not the drug manufacturer, is in the
best position to provide warnings to the patient regarding the dangers
associated with a particular drug.35 Distribution of a prescription drug
to a patient requires a prescription by a physician because pharmaceu-
ticals are presumed to be unavoidably unsafe.36 The physician must
be informed of the qualities and characteristics of the medication so
that he can evaluate the benefits and risks of a particular drug for an
individual patient and convey that information as the physician deems
appropriate.37 The learned intermediary rule has been applied in
prescription drug cases because (1) courts are reluctant to undermine
the physician-patient relationship; (2) physicians, rather than manu-
facturers, are in a superior position to convey information to the
patient; (3) drug manufacturers are unable to communicate with the
patient; and (4) the complexity of the subject matter dictates that the
physician and not the manufacturer provide the patient with drug
information." If the physician was not adequately warned of the risks
of the drug and would not have prescribed it if the physician had been
warned, the patient who was allegedly injured by a drug may be able
to hold the drug manufacturer directly liable.39
isfied when he gives adequate warning to the prescribing physician.). See also Noah, supra note
3, at 155 -56 and notes therein.
34. Martin v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 661 N.E.2d 352, 354 (Ill. 1996).
35. See, e.g., Martin, 661 N.E.2d at 357; Lacy, 567 A.2d at 400 (applying the learned inter-
mediary rule because the patient expects the physician to use his or her "informed independent
judgment to advise the patient and to prescribe the most appropriate use of the drug or device");
Terhune, 90 Wash. 2d at 14, 577 P.2d at 978 (reasoning that if the product is properly labeled
with necessary instructions and warnings, the physician will exercise informed judgment in the
best interest of the patient).
36. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. k (1965). See, e.g., Young, 130
Wash. 2d at 170, 922 P.2d at 64; Grundberg v. Upjohn Co., 813 P.2d 89, 95 (Utah 1991). Pre-
scription drugs pose some risk of side effects in certain persons because drugs are chemical
compounds that are designed to interact with chemical and physiological processes of the human
body. Id.
37. Terhune, 90 Wash. 2d at 14, 577 P.2d at 978. ("[T]he manufacturer may reasonably
assume that the physician will exercise the informed judgment thereby gained in conjunction
with his own independent learning, in the best interest of the patient."). See also Reaves v.
Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 765 F. Supp. 1287, 1289 (E.D. Mich. 1991) (stating that the
physician has a "duty to be informed of the characteristics of prescription drugs and to exercise
independent professional judgment in determining the appropriateness of a specific drug consid-
ering the susceptibilities of the patient."). Cf. Ferrara v. Berlex Laboratories, Inc., 732 F. Supp.
552, 555 (E.D. Pa. 1990) (ruling that the drug manufacturer was not strictly liable when the
physician admitted to negligently prescribing a decongestant and antidepressant for a patient and
the physician had forgotten warnings regarding the dangerous effects of simultaneously adminis-
tering both medicines).
38. See Noah, supra note 3, at 157-59.
39. McEwan v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 528 P.2d 522, 538 (Or. 1974) (holding that
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Even though it is unknown whether courts and legislators will
adopt its revisions, the Restatement (Third) reflects the current, vigor-
ous debate regarding liability of drug manufacturers for alleged
warning defects. The Restatement (Third) adopts the rule that a
prescription drug is "not reasonably safe due to adequate instructions
or warnings if reasonable instructions or warnings" are not provided to
the prescribing "health care providers."4  In comment b of the
Restatement (Third), the reporters express that in certain limited
therapeutic relationships the physician has a "much-diminished" role
as an evaluator and decision maker.4' In those circumstances, it may
be appropriate to impose on the manufacturer the duty to warn the
patient directly. 42 Liability will then depend upon whether the manu-
facturer knew or had reason to know that healthcare providers were
not in a position to reduce the risks of harm in accordance with the
instructions or warnings."
III. EXCEPTIONS TO THE LEARNED INTERMEDIARY RULE
Although Washington courts have not recognized an exception
to the learned intermediary rule in a drug product liability action,
other jurisdictions have recognized exceptions to the learned interme-
diary rule and have held that drug manufacturers can be directly liable
to a consumer. This section will explore whether historical exceptions
to the rule reveal a basis for an additional exception related to direct-
to-consumer advertising. One historical exception is the absence of a
physician to counsel, and a second occurs when a drug manufacturer is
required to provide the patient with product information.
A. Absence of Physician to Counsel
In Davis v. Wyeth Laboratories," the Ninth Circuit recognized an
exception to the learned intermediary rule because a physician was not
manufacturers were negligent in failing to warn physicians in light of the manufacturers' knowl-
edge of the inherent dangers in using contraceptives). See also Allen, 708 F. Supp. at 1148
(denying summary judgment in favor of drug manufacturer in view of plaintiffs' contention that
the manufacturer did not appropriately change warnings provided to physicians regarding the
Cu-7 IUD). See generally Noah, supra note 3, at 160 and notes therein.
40. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 6(d)(1) (1998). The
reasonable health care provider standard also generates controversy because it was created with-
out apparent precedent in case law. Wagner & Peterson, supra note 11, at 230 n.27 (citing
Jeffrey D. Winchester, Section 8(c) of the Proposed Restatement (Third) of Torts: Is It Really What
the Doctor Ordered?, 82 CORNELL L. REV. 644, 665-69 (1997)).
41. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 6(d) cmt. b (1998).
42. Id.
43. Id. § 6(d)(2).
44. 399 F.2d 121 (9th Cir. 1968).
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available to counsel a patient who received a polio vaccination in a
mass vaccination setting. The appellant, Mr. Davis, received the
Type III Sabin oral polio vaccine and, within 30 days, he exhibited
symptoms of polio and ultimately was paralyzed from the waist
down.4" At the vaccination clinic, the only information presented
regarding the vaccine was in posters that did not disclose any risks.46
At the time of the vaccination, the manufacturer, Wyeth Laboratories,
was aware of the risk to adults, albeit a small risk, of contracting polio-
myelitis from the vaccine; it was also aware that the Surgeon General
recommended that vaccination be provided to adults only with "the
full recognition of its very small risk."47 The court found that the
manufacturer had a responsibility to warn against the risks.4" Because
Wyeth Laboratories knew that physicians were not present at the
clinic and that no information was provided to adults that would assist
them in choosing whether or not to have the vaccination, the court
held that Wyeth had failed to warn Mr. Davis and was liable for his
injury.
49
The Fifth Circuit followed Davis in a case involving an infant
injured by a polio vaccine that was administered at a clinic without an
attending physician."0 The defendant, Wyeth, argued that the cir-
cumstances were significantly different than those in Davis: the
infant's parents requested the vaccine; a public health nurse adminis-
tered the vaccine; Wyeth had a passive role in this immunization pro-
gram; and, unlike in Davis, Wyeth had no knowledge that the vaccine
would not be administered as a prescription drug.5' The court did not
find that these grounds justified a result different from Davis.2
Wyeth knew or had reason to know that the clinics dispensed the vac-
cine without consultation with medical personnel; therefore, Wyeth
had a duty to warn users."
The court also was not persuaded by Wyeth's argument that
because the infant's mother had signed a release form purportedly
releasing the state from liability, she assumed the risk that her daugh-
45. Id. at 122.
46. Id. at 125.
47. Id. at 124.
48. Id. at 130.
49. Id. at 131. "[The vaccine] was dispensed to all comers at mass clinics without an indi-
vidualized balancing by a physician of the risks involved .... Here [Wyeth] knew that warnings
were not reaching the consumer." Id.
50. Reyes v. Wyeth Laboratories, 498 F.2d 1264, 1270 (Sth Cir. 1974).
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ter might contract poliof 4 This argument raises a fundamental doc-
trinal problem in failure to warn cases, that is, whether a warning to
the user would in fact have altered his or her decision to use the prod-
uct."5 This issue is also evident in cases where some courts recognize a
second exception to the learned intermediary rule: when a patient is
provided with written information about a drug.
B. Manufacturers Required to Provide Patient with Product Information
For particular pharmaceutical drugs, the FDA requires that
package inserts containing product information be provided to
patients.5 6 The requirement is imposed when the FDA believes that a
patient should be informed of the risks, as well as the benefits, of a
particular drug. For example, manufacturers of birth control pills
must provide a package insert that informs the user of potential
adverse effects. 7 The FDA promulgated these regulations because
healthy women electing to take oral contraceptives have alternative
methods of treatment available to them, and because oral contracep-
tives have a relatively high incidence of serious illnesses associated
with their use." The FDA also found a patient may not remember
everything mentioned to her in conversation with her physician, and
therefore, in order to make an informed decision, she should have
written available information for future reference.5 9
The intent of the FDA regulation is not to displace the primary
relationship between the physician and the patient: the physician has
the "primary responsibility" to caution and warn.6 ° A majority of
54. Id. at 1278.
55. See Henderson & Twerski, supra note 29, at 305. In order to prove direct liability of a
manufacturer, a plaintiff would not only have to prove that she would have read, understood, and
remembered the warning but also that she would have altered her conduct to avoid injury. Hen-
derson and Twerski contend that the plaintiff can offer "little more than self-serving testimony
and anecdotal evidence" to establish proximate cause. Id.
56. See Patient Package Inserts for Oral Contraceptives, 21 C.F.R. § 310.501 (2000);
Patient Package Inserts for Estrogens, 21 C.F.R. § 310.515 (2000). See also Lacy, 567 A.2d at
401 (noting that at the time of litigation, federal regulation required manufacturers of IUDs to
provide direct warning to consumer); Edwards v. Basel Pharmaceuticals, 933 P.2d 298 (Okla.
1997) (product inserts required for nicotine patches).
57. 21 C.F.R. § 310.501(c)(7)-(10) (2000). An adverse effect is defined as any medical con-
dition that worsens or appears after a patient begins to take the drug. 21 C.F.R. § 130.45(a)
(2000). Post-marketing reporting of adverse drug experiences is required of drug manufacturers.
21 C.F.R. § 314.80 (2000).
58. See MacDonald v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 475 N.E.2d 65, 69-70 (Mass. 1985)
(citing 43 Fed. Reg. 4,215 (1978)).
59. See id. (citing 35 Fed. Reg. 9,002 (1970)).
60. See, e.g., MacPherson v. Searle & Co., 775 F. Supp. 417, 425-26 (D.D.C. 1991) (citing
the FDA Commissioner's comments regarding package insert requirements for oral contracep-
tives (43 Fed. Reg. 4,215 (1978)).
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jurisdictions has retained the learned intermediary rule in cases involv-
ing injury from birth control pill use.6'
A minority of jurisdictions, rejecting the doctrine, has ruled that
when written information is provided to the patient as required by
federal regulations, the drug manufacturer can be found directly
liable to the patient if the information did not provide adequate warn-
ing.63 In MacDonald v. Ortho,64 the court found that birth control pills
had peculiar characteristics that warranted imposing on the manufac-
turer a common law duty to warn users directly of associated risks.6"
In Odgers v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp.,66 the court followed Mac-
Donald, finding the holding a "more reasoned rule of law."67  The
learned intermediary rule was rejected because "the healthy, young
consumer of oral contraceptives is usually actively involved in the
decision to use 'the pill,' as opposed to other available birth control
products," relegating the physician to a relatively passive role.68 Both
courts reasoned that the physician is also less involved because the
patient renews the prescription yearly, and the renewal can be accom-
plished with a phone call instead of an office visit.69
One policy argument supporting the learned intermediary rule is
that a physician should shield a patient from the knowledge of poten-
tial risks if those risks induce fear rather than inform." The potential
detrimental consequence is that the patient would refuse what the
physician considers necessary treatment." In Odgers, however, the
61. See, e.g., Martin, 661 N.E.2d at 352; MacPherson, 775 F. Supp. at 417; Reaves, 765 F.
Supp. at 1287 (repudiating the holdings in Odgers v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 609 F. Supp.
867 (D.C. Mich. 1985), and Stephens v. G.D. Searle & Co., 602 F. Supp. 379 (E.D. Mich.
1985)).
62. See 21 C.F.R. § 310.501 (2000).
63. See MacDonald, 475 NE.2d at 65; Odgers, 609 F. Supp. at 867; Stephens, 602 F. Supp.
at 379. See also Edwards v. Basel Pharmaceuticals, 116 F.3d 1341 (10th Cir. 1997). Basel
claimed that it met the FDA requirements regulating the product insert it provided to patients
about the drug Halbitrol, a nicotine patch, and therefore met its duty to warn. The Tenth Cir-
cuit Court reversed a district court grant of summary judgment in favor of the manufacturer after
the Oklahoma Supreme Court ruled in Edwards v. Basel Pharmaceuticals, 933 P.2d 298, 303
(Okla. 1997), that if a drug manufacturer is required by the FDA to provide package inserts to
the patient, an exception to the learned intermediary rule applies.
64. MacDonald, 475 N.E.2d at 65.
65. Id. at 69.
66. Odgers, 609 F. Supp. at 867.
67. Id. at 879.
68. MacDonald, 475 N.E.2d at 69.
69. Id.; Odgers, 609 F. Supp. at 878.
70. Odgers, 609 F. Supp. at 874 (citing P. Rheingold, Products Liability-The Ethical Drug
Manufacturer's Liability, 18 RUTGERS L. REV. 947 (1964)).
71. Id. at 878. See also Schwarz, supra note 3, at 830 n.9 (citing William J. Curran, Package
Inserts for Patients: Informed Consent in the 1980s, 305 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1564 (1981), in which
the author argued that because patients lacked expertise necessary to assess warnings about side
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court maintained that informed choice was more critical.72 Because a
woman choosing birth control pills as a contraceptive method has sev-
eral alternatives, the additional information ensures that she will make
an informed choice.
73
Many of the policy arguments supporting the exception to the
learned intermediary rule seem counterintuitive. The relationship
between a woman and her physician develops early in life because
women seek and need medical advice about birth control, pregnancy,
and cancer prevention.74 Health care programs advocate that all
women see a gynecologist or general practitioner once a year.7" In
Reaves v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp.,76 a physician testified that
before a doctor prescribes birth control pills, "standard practice" dic-
tates that a physician interview a patient about herself and her family's
medical history and conduct a complete physical examination.77 The
witness characterized the physician's role as active rather than passive,
with both the physician and patient sharing in the decision-making
regarding which contraceptive method is appropriate for the patient.
78
Testimony was also offered that "most practitioners" prescribe birth
control pills for three to six months initially so that the patient and
physician can evaluate whether the woman has suffered any side
effects. 9
The argument that physicians do not act as learned intermedi-
aries because they have a passive role in prescribing other birth control
methods also fails. In Hill v. Searle Laboratories,"° the court found an
exception to the learned intermediary rule when the patient had an
intrauterine device (IUD) inserted under "clinic-type conditions,"
limiting the physician-patient contact.8' However, a physician must
skillfully insert an IUD, which can be painful and have complications,
effects, they might be frightened and not take needed medications).
72. Odgers, 609 F. Supp. at 878.
73. Id.
74. The American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists recommends that women
have an annual pelvic exam beginning in their early to middle 20s. Mayo Clinic Family Health
2.0, (IVI Publishing, Minneapolis, Minn. 1996) (CD Rom on file with the author).
75. See id.
76. Reaves, 765 F. Supp. at 1287.
77. Id. at 1290. The witness for the defendant was the Chairperson of Obstetrics and
Gynecology at Detroit Henry Ford Hospital and a clinical professor at the University of Michi-
gan Medical School. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id. A faculty member at a school of pharmacy testified that many prescriptions are
offered for three to six months, and therefore, the same practice with birth control pills is not
unusual. Id. at n.2.
80. 884 F.2d 1064 (8th Cir. 1989).
81. Id. at 1071 (finding an exception to the learned intermediary rule in part because the
physician-patient contact is limited in "clinic-type conditions").
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requiring a physician to actively participate in a patient's care.12 Most
importantly, for birth control methods as well as for other drugs, if a
drug has serious adverse effects, the physician's role is more impor-
tant, not less.83
Cases involving injury from birth control pills also raise the issue
of whether an adequately warned patient would heed the warning if it
were properly given. In MacDonald,84 the court found that the prod-
uct information describing the risks associated with birth control pills
was inadequate.8" Essentially, the decision turned on the lack of a
word in the pamphlet-stroke. 86  The manufacturer warned users of
birth control pills that "[the] most serious known side effect is abnor-
mal blood clotting which can be fatal." 87 The pamphlet listed numer-
ous symptoms, including weakness and numbness of an arm or leg,
and stated that a woman experiencing any of the symptoms should call
her doctor immediately and stop taking the pill.88 The plaintiff in
MacDonald purportedly experienced two episodes of numbness in her
hand, which she did not report to her doctor.89 Ortho argued that this
evidence supported the belief that MacDonald would not have heeded
the warning even if the pamphlet warned patients against the possibil-
ity of "stroke" rather than blood clotting.9" The court, however, did
not consider this evidence because it raised the issue of comparative
negligence, which was not raised in the court below.'
Holding a drug company liable because the patient did not
understand, or arguably chose to ignore, the warning illustrates that
the standard a drug company needs to meet to fulfill its duty to warn
82. See Lacy, 567 A.2d at 401 (finding the rationale supporting the learned intermediary
rule in IUD contraception cases is stronger than in cases involving birth control pills because the
patient must "rely on her physician's expertise whenever an IUD is used").
83. See Reaves, 765 F. Supp. at 1291. In In re Norplant, the court bluntly commented on
the decision in Edwards v. Basel Pharmaceuticals, 933 P.2d 298 (Okla. 1997): "[w]hy the learned
intermediary doctrine should somehow be less applicable when the severity of the side effects
encourages the FDA to promote additional labeling escapes us." 165 F.3d at 379.
84. MacDonald, 475 N.E.2d at 65.
85. Id. at 71-72.
86. Id. at 67, n.4.
87. Id. at 67. A stroke occurs when a blood vessel that brings oxygen and nutrients to the
brain bursts or is clogged by a blood clot or some other particle. Strokes are categorized into four
main types, two caused by blood clots and two caused by hemorrhage, a rupturing of a blood
vessel. Strokes caused by blood clots or other particles are far more common, accounting for
about 70-80% of all strokes. American Heart Association, Heart and Stroke A-Z Guide, (last
visited June 18, 2000) <http://www.americanheart.org/Heartand-Stroke-A-Z-Guide/stroke.
html>.
88. MacDonald, 475 N.E.2d at 67 n.4.
89. Id. at 72.
90. Id. See Henderson & Twerski, supra note 55, regarding the difficulty of proving that a
plaintiff would have heeded a warning if given.
91. MacDonald, 475 N.E.2d at 72.
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is difficult and perhaps unrealistic. While providing information
about the risks of birth control pills directly to the consumer is valu-
able and important, the decision in MacDonald illustrates the unfair
consequences of this requirement when a drug manufacturer believes
it has presented the risks in lay language.92
A number of courts hearing similar cases have retained the
learned intermediary rule and held for the drug manufacturer.93 In
MacPherson v. Searle,94 a case in which a woman suffered a loss of
vision as a result of using oral contraceptives, the plaintiff contended
that the learned intermediary rule should not be applied and that the
manufacturer was directly liable because it failed to supply an ade-
quate warning. A pamphlet provided to the patient stated that blood
clots "occur rarely in the blood vessels of the eye, resulting in blind-
ness or impairment of vision in that eye."9" The package insert also
cautioned the user regarding "[d]isorders of vision." 96 Mrs. MacPher-
son acknowledged that she read the package insert, but "as a lay
person reading the risks and adverse reaction section .... [she] did not
realize that permanent loss of eyesight was a risk associated with birth
control pills." 97 The court ruled that the warning was sufficient and
the learned intermediary rule applied.98 Even if the manufacturer had
a duty to warn the patient directly, the court stated it likely would
have found that the plain language of the package insert supplied
adequate information.99
The MacDonald court appeared to focus on the role of physicians
and drug manufacturers in prescription drug liability cases, but it
actually may have been struggling with the unarticulated and under-
lying issue of the "balancing process ... between the need for ade-
quate recovery and viable enterprises.""' In Reyes v. Wyeth Labora-
tories, 01 the court stated that a drug manufacturer is in a better
92. In MacDonald, the dissent argued that while the majority found it unnecessary to
decide whether Ortho complied with the FDA's required language, "I do not believe that any
rational trier of fact could have concluded that Ortho failed to comply with the regulation." Id.
at 75.
93. See Odgers, 609 F. Supp. at 874 n.15; MacPherson, 775 F. Supp. at 425 (citing the
dissent in MacDonald and listing fourteen court decisions that adhered to the learned intermedi-
ary rule).
94. 775 F. Supp. 417 (D.D.C. 1991).
95. Id. at 419-20.
96. Id. at 420 and 425.
97. Id. at 420.
98. Id. at 425.
99. See id.
100. Reyes, 498 F.2d at 1294 (citing Helene Curtis Industries, Inc. v. Pruitt, 385 F.2d 841,
862 (5th Cir. 1967)).
101. Reyes, 498 F.2d at 1264.
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position to pay for injuries resulting from use when the risk "was fore-
seeable statistically, although unknowable individually.' ' 1 2  Rather
than the costs falling on the injured, the costs could be borne by the
manufacturer as a foreseeable cost of doing business; this extra mone-
tary burden would be "passed on to the public in the form of price
increases to customers.' ' 10 3 The court's task is to determine whether a
person's injury occurred because of statistical probability, or because
the physician or manufacturer failed to warn the injured plaintiff.
IV. WASHINGTON CASE LAW
Washington courts have decided few cases in which injured
plaintiffs have directly sued pharmaceutical drug manufacturers. 4
The courts follow comment k of Section 402A of the Second Restate-
ment, which defines pharmaceutical drugs as unavoidably unsafe
products. In Terhune v. A.H. Robins Co.,"°5 Washington adopted the
learned intermediary rule and the courts have not since recognized any
exceptions.
In Terhune, the plaintiff was injured by the Dalkon Shield, an
IUD, when it perforated her uterus. She sued the manufacturer claim-
ing that the company did not adequately warn her of the risks of using
the device. The court concluded that the manufacturer was not liable
because it had a duty to warn her physician; it did not have a duty to
warn the patient directly.0 6 The physician was aware of the risk but
chose not to inform the patient, a choice, the court stated, that resulted
from "an exercise of judgment on the physician's part."'0 7
In contrast to the court in MacDonald,"°8 the Terhune court
emphasized the physician's responsibility to advise the patient of the
advantages and disadvantages of various choices of therapy, even
though the patient made the final choice. °9 Medical care decisions
other than birth control selection can also present a variety of treat-
ment choices, and a physician can encourage the patient to choose a
102. Id. at 1294.
103. See id.
104. Cases decided by the Washington Supreme Court include Young, 130 Wash. 2d 160,
922 P.2d 59 (1996); Washington State Physicians Ins. Exchange and Ass'n v. Fisons Corp., 122
Wash. 2d 299, 858 P.2d 1054 (1993); Rogers v. Miles Laboratories, Inc., 116 Wash. 2d 195, 802
P.2d 1346 (1991); McKee v. American Home Products, 113 Wash. 2d 701, 782 P.2d 1045 (1989);
Terhune, 90 Wash. 2d 9, 577 P.2d 975 (1978).
105. 90 Wash. 2d at 9, 577 P.2d at 975.
106. Id. at 17, 577 P.2d at 979.
107. Id. at 16, 577 P.2d at 979.
108. 475 N.E.2d 65.
109. Terhune, 90 Wash. 2d at 15, 577 P.2d at 978.
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particular course for herself." ' In any situation, "the patient is
expected to look to the physician for guidance" regarding treatment
and not to the manufacturer of products that might be prescribed."1 '
The Terhune court found that the manufacturer has a duty to warn the
physician and, if it performs this duty, even if the physician decides to
withhold the information from the patient, the manufacturer should
not be held accountable for an injury to the patient.' 2 If the manufac-
turer has warned the physician of the danger attendant to the use of a
product, the manufacturer need not inform the patient as well."'
Mrs. Terhune testified that she had reviewed a pamphlet pub-
lished by the manufacturer and that the pamphlet did not mention any
risk of uterine perforation. At the time of litigation, IUD manufactur-
ers were not required to supply patients with product inserts."4 Argu-
ably, the pamphlet promoted the product without presenting the
risks)" Even so, the court found that the physician decided whether
to give Mrs. Terhune the pamphlet and whether to warn her of the
risk of perforation." 6 Whether Mrs. Terhune would have chosen to
use a Dalkon Shield if she had been informed of the risk is a matter of
speculation. The case does illustrate the importance of balancing the
presentation of benefits and risks in drug information provided to
patients.
Washington courts consistently have found that only physicians
play the key role of learned intermediaries. In McKee v. American
Home Products Corp.,"7 the Washington Supreme Court refused to
extend the duty to warn to pharmacists. The court held that pharma-
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 16-17, 577 P.2d at 979.
113. Id.
114. In 1977, the FDA required that a package insert be made available to patients inter-
ested in using an IUD as a contraceptive. The FDA required that the pamphlet list adverse
reactions and risks. Spychala v. G.D. Searle & Co., 705 F. Supp. 1024, 1027-28 (D.N.J. 1988)
(citing 21 C.F.R. § 310.502(b)(2)).
115. The risk of uterine perforation was purportedly minimal. Terhune, 90 Wash. 2d at 17,
577 P.2d at 979. A.H. Robins did, however, eventually withdraw the Dalkon Shield from the
market in 1974 because of the number of women who reported injury and disease related to its
insertion. Bankruptcy proceedings for A.H. Robins concluded in 1989 with the creation of the
Dalkon Shield Claimants Trust. See In re A.H. Robins, Co., 42 F.3d 870 (4th Cir. 1994). This
Comment focuses on the learned intermediary rule litigation and does not address the merits of
the design defect litigation. For an account of this civil litigation, bankruptcy proceeding, and
products liability litigation, see RICHARD B. SOBOL, BENDING THE LAW: THE STORY OF THE
DALKON SHIELD BANKRUPTCY (1991).
116. Terhune, 90 Wash. 2d at 15-16, 577 P.2d at 979.
117. 113 Wash. 2d 701, 782 P.2d 1045. McKee also named her physician and the drug
manufacturer as defendants. The Washington Supreme Court only heard the plaintiffs appeal
from a summary judgment motion granted to the defendant pharmacists.
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cists, like manufacturers, do not have sufficient medical education or
knowledge of the patient's medical history to justify imposing upon
them a duty to intrude into the physician-patient relationship.' 18 The
plaintiff, McKee, sought damages for physical and psychological
injuries allegedly sustained as a result of an addiction to an ampheta-
mine prescribed for weight loss." 9 Warnings accompanying the drug
stated that the drug should be prescribed for only a few weeks because
patients become tolerant to its anorectic effect and might become
addicted and suffer adverse effects. 120  The pharmacists refilled
McKee's prescription for over ten years. The court held that the
pharmacist had a duty to accurately fill a prescription but did not have
a duty to question a judgment made by the physician or to warn
consumers.' 21 Seemingly taken aback by the majority decision, Justice
Dore, writing for the dissent,12 wrote that the pharmacists have a duty
of care as health care providers.2 2 The dissent argued that knowing
this drug should only be prescribed for a few weeks fit within the
majority's definition of "obvious lethal dosages, inadequacies in the
instructions" or "known contraindications" that require "corrective
measures. "124
The decisions in Terhune and McKee suggest that Washington
courts view the physician's knowledge of any dangers to patients who
take a particular drug as central to the physician's role as learned inter-
mediary. In Young v. Key Pharmaceuticals, the Washington Supreme
Court addressed the issue of when a drug company should warn a
physician. 2  A young boy treated for asthma with the prescription
drug theophylline suffered brain damage resulting from seizures alleg-
edly caused by toxic levels of the drug in his bloodstream. 26 The boy
had been suffering flu-like symptoms and a fever at the time. The
plaintiff claimed that Key had not warned physicians about the effects
of viral infection on a patient's ability to metabolize theophylline.
127
Concurrent with the time of the plaintiffs injury, another drug manu-
facturer had published an advertisement in a medical journal stating
that high fever and certain viral illnesses could decrease elimination of
118. McKee, 113 Wash. 2dat 711, 782 P.2dat 1051.
119. Id. at 704, 782 P.2d at 1047.
120. Id. at 722, 782 P.2d at 1056.
121. Id. at 720, 782 P.2d at 1055-56.
122. Justice Dore wrote the dissent with Justices Utter and Brachtenbach and Justice Pro
Tern Pearson concurring.
123. McKee, 113 Wash. 2d at 723, 782 P.2d at 1057 (Dore, J., dissenting).
124. Id. at 734, 782 P.2d at 1063.
125. 130 Wash. 2d 160, 922 P.2d 59 (1996).
126. Id. at 162, 922 P.2d at 60.
127. Id.
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the drug. Because the plaintiff did not present sufficient evidence that
Key knew or should have known that children with fevers were at
greater risk, 121 the supreme court reversed the decision of the appellate
court and affirmed the jury verdict at trial that Key was not
negligent.
129
Nothing in Young or in other cases indicates that Washington
courts will depart from the learned intermediary rule, so long as drug
manufacturers adequately warn physicians of risks associated with the
drug. Although not raised in Young, an issue presented by the facts in
that case is why one drug company chose to issue a warning about
theophylline and another did not. 3 °  Key contended that the
relationship between the fevers or viral illnesses and theophylline was
"not yet clinically reliable."'31 The other manufacturer may have had
more data on which to base its decision, or it may have acted more
cautiously on the basis of its internal policy. Another question is
whether the FDA was involved in the decision-making of either
manufacturer.
V. FDA REGULATIONS
A. Compliance-Minimum Requirement, Rebuttable
Presumption, or Evidence to Be Considered?
In determining whether a manufacturer has met its duty in fail-
ure to warn cases, courts have considered the weight that should be
given to a drug manufacturer's defense that it complied with pertinent
FDA regulations. According to a minority, compliance creates a
rebuttable presumption that the manufacturer has met its duty to
warn.1 2 The majority of courts, including courts that have decided to
displace the learned intermediary rule or to create an exception to it, as
well as those that have retained the rule, holds that compliance with
FDA regulations is not dispositive.133
The majority view is that a manufacturer's compliance with
FDA regulations shows only that the manufacturer has met minimum
safety requirements.'34 Courts support this view with the comments
128. Id. at 174-75, 922 P.2d at 66-67.
129. Id. at 179, 922 P.2d at 68-69.
130. The evidence regarding the other manufacturer's advertisement was not admitted
because it lacked the proper foundation. This evidence would be relevant to prove negligence
only if it indicated the industry standard. Id. at 174-75, 922 P.2d at 66-67.
131. Id. at 165, 922 P.2d at 62.
132. See Perez, 734 A.2d at 1245.
133. See Martin, 661 N.E.2d at 243-44 and citations therein.
134. See, e.g., Allen, 708 F. Supp. at 1152 (stating regulations established by the FDA are
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of the FDA Commissioner, who stated that whether a manufacturer is
liable depends "upon the facts surrounding the manufacture, sale, and
use of the drug product, and on the nature of the injury.""13 Further-
more, laws governing drug product liability "can be adjusted by state
courts and Legislatures in light of the facts presented by patient label-
ing."' 36 Whether a manufacturer knew or should have known that a
drug presented greater dangers than those indicated in its required
warning is a decision for the courts. 37 State courts provide protection
for plaintiffs because plaintiffs cannot contest the adequacy of the
warnings by bringing suit against the FDA. Under the Federal Drug
and Cosmetics Act, consumers do not have a private right of action.38
Not all courts are convinced that the FDA has adequate staffing,
expertise, or databases to warrant substituting FDA compliance for
judicial scrutiny.'39 Even when a drug manufacturer adheres to all
FDA regulations, all the risks related to the administration of a partic-
ular drug may not come to the attention of the agency until more con-
sumers have used the drug. A drug company may perform the clinical
studies necessary to assess a drug's safety and then, after the drug is
marketed and more widely distributed, find that it presents additional
risks. Not until the drug is sold and more people begin to use it do the
more rare, unexpected adverse events become apparent. Young raised
the issue of when a manufacturer should warn physicians of an unex-
pected adverse effect of a drug.4 ' The defendant argued that a manu-
facturer's knowledge of adverse effects caused by its product is not
imputed when a competitor chooses to inform the medical community
about a serious adverse effect associated with a similar product.'
minimum standards and do not conflict with state laws that set higher standards for due care and
safety); Spychala, 705 F. Supp. at 1030 ("[W]hile FDA regulation of prescription drugs may
establish minimum standards for product design and warning labels, compliance does not neces-
sarily absolve a manufacturer of tort liability."); Odgers, 609 F. Supp. at 877-78 ("FDA's
regulation of oral contraceptives was not intended in any way to preclude imposition of tort lia-
bility for failure to warn."); MacDonald, 475 N.E.2d at 70-71 ("Compliance with FDA require-
ments, though admissible to demonstrate lack of negligence, is not conclusive on this issue.");
McEwan, 528 P.2d at 534 (holding warnings may be found inadequate even though all govern-
ment regulations and requirements were satisfactorily met).
135. Spychala, 705 F. Supp. at 1031; (quoting 43 Fed. Reg. 4214 (1978)); Odgers, 609 F.
Supp. at 877; MacDonald, 475 N.E.2d at 70.
136. 43 Fed. Reg. 4214 (1978).
137. See McEwan, 528 P.2d at 534.
138. See Martin, 661 N.E.2d at 356.
139. See Grundberg v. Upjohn Co., 813 P.2d 89, 100 (Utah, 1991) (Stewart, J., dissenting)
(citing Toner v. Lederle Laboratories, 732 P.2d 297, 313 (Idaho 1987)).
140. Young, 130 Wash. 2d at 160, 922 P.2d at 59.
141. Id. at 174-75, 922 P.2d at 67-68.
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While drug manufacturers are required by the FDA to report all
unexpected and serious adverse events, 42 the FDA may or may not
respond to the manufacturer in a timely manner. In Grundberg v.
Upjohn Co.,"' the dissent contended that the FDA has made critical
errors in judging some products to be safe.' Drugs that purportedly
met the FDA requirements were found later to pose significant
risks.'45 Delay in identifying the risks leads to delay in warning physi-
cians about the potential adverse effects of a drug upon certain
patients.'46
A minority of courts has found that when a pharmaceutical com-
pany adheres to FDA regulations, the company presumptively meets
its duty to warn. In Perez v. Wyeth Laboratories,147 the court asserted
that if Wyeth, the manufacturer of Norplant, complied with the FDA
guidelines regarding advertising, labeling, and warning, then it pre-
sumptively met its duty to warn. 4 ' The court reasoned that by apply-
ing the rebuttable presumption, the manufacturer's duty to both
physicians and the public was "harmonized" with the public's interest
in being informed about available therapies.'49 The court's ultimate
rationale was that without this presumption, drug manufacturers
would be considered guarantors of patient safety and sued for injuries
that were not scientifically verifiable.' The consequence that con-
cerned the Perez court and commentators is that over-deterrence will
142. 21 C.F.R. § 314.80 (2000). Post-marketing reporting of adverse drug experiences
requires that the manufacturer report unexpected adverse events within 15 days after the manu-
facturer is notified that such an event occurred. § 314.80(c)(1)(i). A seller or distributor of the
drug is required to keep these records for a minimum of ten years. § 314.80(i).
143. 813 P.2d 89 (1991). The issue before the court was whether a drug manufacturer
should be held to strict liability when the plaintiffs claim is based on a design defect. The court
ruled a drug that has been approved by the FDA for sale has passed through "the extensive regu-
latory system" and should be immune from strict liability. Id. at 99. While the court accepted
adherence to regulations as a defense to allegations of design defect, it ruled that a company may
still be liable for a failure to warn. Id. at 97. The data that provide the basis for the label of a
drug are the same data that show that the drug can safely be given to patients. The court's
willingness to accept compliance as support for drug design, but not adequate warning, seems
inconsistent.
144. Id. at 100.
145. See id. The dissent stated "[n]umerous congressional investigations have demon-
strated that the FDA has often approved drugs in complete ignorance of critical information
relating to the hazards of such drugs which was contained either in its own files or in the pub-
lished medical literature, or both." Id.
146. Seeid. at 100-02.
147. 734 A.2d 1245 (1999).





impede the research and development of new products.' This argu-
ment, however, remains theoretical.
5 2
The majority viewpoint, that meeting FDA requirements is a
minimum standard, will result in a more consistent application of the
law and arguably provide better protection to the consumer. The
FDA, like other regulatory agencies, can change policies as political
realities change. Even though federal agencies may sometimes be slow
to change policies (the FDA is one of the most notorious in this
regard'53), agency rules can be challenged in court. The FDA also
establishes policies on pharmaceutical drug advertising; thus, the
agency and those it impacts should consider what role the FDA
should play in regulating information content provided from drug
companies to consumers and physicians.
B. FDA Regulation of Drug Manufacturer Print
and Broadcast Advertising
The FDA has regulated drug product advertising since 1963.
The early statutes did not contain language defining the audience for
these advertisements, but at that time Congress was concerned with
regulating advertisements directed to health care professionals. 5 4 In
the mid-1980s, drug companies began to advertise directly to con-
sumers, prompting the FDA to request a voluntary moratorium on
direct-to-consumer advertising in order to allow it to review the prac-
tice.155 In 1985, the moratorium was withdrawn,5 6 and drug compa-
nies have steadily increased direct-to-consumer advertising."'
The FDA has defined three categories of direct-to-consumer
promotion. One category consists of "product-claim" advertisements,
which contain safety and efficacy claims about a particular drug."5
151. See id. See also Michael D. Green, Statutory Compliance and Tort Liability: Examin-
ing the Strongest Case, U. MICH. J. L. REFORM 461, 466-67 (1997).
152. In Grundberg, the dissent contended that increasing profitability would result in mak-
ing more unnecessarily dangerous drugs available. "Furthermore, not a shred of evidence has
been presented to this Court that indicates that liability under the tort system has deterred phar-
maceutical companies from introducing new drugs." 813 P.2d at 102-03.
153. See Robert W. Hamilton, Procedures for the Adoption of Rules of General Applicability:
The Need for Procedural Innovation in Administrative Rulemaking, 60 CAL. L. REV. 1276, 1287-
88 (1972) (noting that more than 7,700 pages of transcript were generated regarding the question
of whether peanut butter should consist of 90% peanuts or 87.5% peanuts).
154. For a brief historical perspective, see Noah, supra note 3, at 142-43 and Reeves, supra
note 1, at 663. Prescription drug advertisement regulations are codified at 21 C.F.R. § 202.1
(2000).
155. Direct-to-Consumer Promotion, 60 Fed. Reg. 42,581 (1995).
156. Id.
157. See supra note 1.
158. Direct-to- Consumer Promotion, 60 Fed. Reg. at 42,582.
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The second category includes "help-seeking" advertisements, which
provide information about a disease or condition and recommend that
the consumer consult a health care provider.' Generally, mention or
discussion of particular drugs or treatments is excluded. The third,
"reminders," contain limited information about a particular drug and
do not include "representations or suggestions" about the drug.
160
Regulations governing the content of print and broadcast adver-
tisements necessarily differ because of the differences in each type of
media. For print media, a brief summary must present a description
of side effects, contraindications, and effectiveness, 161 as well as all
risk-related information that is required for a product's package
labeling.'62 Drug manufacturers could not practically meet these
requirements in television commercials and in other broadcast media.
Therefore, in 1997, the FDA modified the brief summary require-
ments, adding the requirement for an "adequate provision" and a
"major statement."' 63 The content of a major statement must include
the major risks associated with the drug and must be presented either
in the audio portion or in both the audio and visual portion of the
broadcast advertisement. 64  In conjunction with presentation of risk
information in the major statement, the "adequate provision" require-
ment is fulfilled when the company disseminates the approved drug
package label. 6 ' Because the labeling may be too complex for con-
sumers without medical training to understand, the guidelines encour-
age manufacturers to provide "consumer-friendly information that is
consistent with approved product labeling. "166
Advertisements are reviewed within the FDA by the Division of




161. 21 C.F.R. § 202.1(e)(1) (2000).
162. See supra note 26. Labeling is a term of art and includes written, printed, or graphic
information "(1) upon any [drug or device] or any of its containers or wrappers, or (2) accompa-
nying such [drug or device]." 21 U.S.C. § 321(k) & (m) (1999).
163. Draft Guidance for Industry; Consumer-Directed Broadcast Advertisements, 62 Fed.
Reg. 43,171 (1997). The Draft Guidance can be accessed at <http://www.fda.gov/cder/
guidance/index.htm.> The regulations specifically addressed advertising of prescription drugs
through broadcast media, which included radio, television, or telephone communication systems.
See Allen, supra note 3, at 123-24.
164. Draft Guidance for Industry, 62 Fed. Reg. at 43,172.
165. Id. The FDA encourages drug companies to include the FDA-approved patient
labeling as part of the full prescribing information. The Draft Guidance noted that the FDA
would solicit feedback as to whether consumers took advantage of the availability of these prod-
uct inserts. 62 Fed. Reg. at 43,173.
166. Draft Guidance for Industry, 62 Fed. Reg. at 43,172.
167. Communications through Internet websites generally must meet the more extensive
requirements governing print media. Even though DDMAC has sent a few warning letters to
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The Division does not require pre-screening of advertisements prior
to airing; therefore, DDMAC responds to ads already viewed by the
public. 6' If an advertisement does not present a summary of risks, or
if the presentation is not equal in display to the description of the
potential benefit of the drug, DDMAC considers the advertisement
misleading and it will send a "notice of violation" letter or, for more
flagrant conduct, a warning letter, to the offending manufacturer. 169
In the letter, DDMAC will describe the violation and what remedial
action is expected to correct the presentation. DDMAC posts the let-
ters on its website, which is accessible to the public.17°
Television advertisements for prescription drugs, because of their
brevity and minimal content, would likely not be considered, and
should not be considered, a warning of the risks to consumers if they
take the drugs. However, lack of adequate information in the label
and in consumer pamphlets given to the patients could provide the
basis of a lawsuit for failure to warn. At this time, drug companies are
asked to provide this information as a service; however, the guideline
does not have the weight of law behind it. Advocates for control of
drug manufacturer advertising can comment to the FDA that the dis-
semination of information should move beyond a recommendation to
a requirement.'7 '
C. Future Challenge to FDA's Power to Regulate
Drug Manufacturer Advertising
Reliance on the FDA to monitor prescription drug commercials
and to force drug companies to comply with the guidance may be mis-
placed. Drug companies are expected to increase the advertising of
drug manufacturers, it has not actively monitored pharmaceutical company websites. The FDA
has not commented whether the agency has adequate resources for monitoring websites or whe-
ther it has the authority to do so. The Federal Trade Commission may be the appropriate
agency for regulating website content. See generally Kristen Green, Comment, Marketing Health
Care Products on the Internet: A Proposal for Updated Federal Regulations, 24 AM. J.L. & MED.
365 (1998); Marilyn A. Moberg et al., Surfing the Net in Shallow Waters: Product Liability
Concerns and Advertising on the Internet, 53 FOOD DRUG L.J. 213 (1998).
168. See Direct-to-Consumer Promotion, 61 Fed. Reg. 24,314, 24,315 (2000). See also
Terzian, supra note 3, at 153; Reeves, supra note 1, at 666 and notes therein.
169. Reeves, supra note 1, at 666 and notes therein. An advertiser is prohibited from pre-
senting false or misleading statements. 21 U.S.C. § 352(n) (1999).
170. The DDMAC home page can be accessed at <http://www.fda.gov.cder.ddmac>.
The warning letters can be accessed through the home page or at <http://www.fda.gov./cder/
warn/index.htm>. Even though a manufacturer's nonconformity with a guidance principle does
not have the same legal consequence as a violation of a regulation, the warning letters have
impact. A broadcast company removed advertisements for Claritin when the manufacturer,
Schering-Plough, received a warning letter from DDMAC. See Terzian, supra note 3, at 153-54.
171. See Schwartz, supra note 3, at 847.
2000]
Seattle University Law Review
their products on television. i 2 The increase will require DDMAC to
expend more resources to monitor the increase in the number of com-
mercials. In times of limited resources, surveillance may be minimal
because the FDA must maintain its primary mission to evaluate the
safety and efficacy of new drugs.'73
In addition, the FDA may soon face a constitutional challenge of
its power to regulate advertisements. The Washington Legal Founda-
tion (WLF),'74 a free market-oriented public interest law and policy
center, is considering whether to challenge FDA guidelines on the
grounds that they violate a drug company's rights of commercial free
speech.'75 The issue is whether the FDA's restrictions on truthful,
nonmisleading speech present an undue burden on constitutionally
protected speech.'76
The WLF recently challenged certain FDA requirements
imposed on manufacturers that promote off-label use of their prod-
ucts.'7 7 An off-label use is one not specifically defined on the drug's
label.t78 Physicians are free to prescribe a drug for an off-label use,
such as prescribing a different dose or a different dosing schedule or
prescribing a drug for a disease not named on the label but related to
the medical condition indicated on the label (thus, varying the patient
population treated).'79 While off-label use by physicians is considered
a common practice, particularly in oncology' and pediatrics,' 8 ' and in
172. See supra note 1.
173. See Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. 301; 21 U.S.C. 355(a), (b), and
(j) (1994).
174. The Washington Legal Foundation (WLF) advocates "free enterprise and economic
growth, a balanced and reasonable judiciary, limited and accountable government, due process
rights for the victims of violent crime, and the effective administration of justice." Capital
Research Center, Guide to Nonprofit Advocacy and Policy Groups (last visited June 18, 2000)
<http://www.capitalresearch.org/advocacy%20guide/Groups/wlf.html>. The WLF Internet
homepage can be accessed at www.wlf.org.
175. DTC Ads Could Be WLF's Next Constitutional Challenge, THE PINK SHEET, FDA/F-
D-C REPORTS, INC., Oct. 18, 1999, at 27.
176. Id. (quoting Sandra Dennis, attorney for Morgan, Lewis & Bockius).
177. Washington Legal Foundation v. Friedman, 13 F. Supp. 2d 51 (D.D.C. 1998) appeal
dismissed, vacated in part sub nom. Washington Legal Foundation v. Henney, 202 F.3d 331
(D.C. Cir. 2000); Washington Legal Foundation v. Henney, 56 F. Supp. 2d 81 (D.D.C. 1999)
appeal dismissed, vacated in part 202 F.3d 331.
178. See supra notes 26 and 163.
179. A drug manufacturer designs its clinical studies to investigate the treatment of a par-
ticular disease or condition in a particular, well-defined patient population. The results of the
studies, in turn, define what the drug company can claim in its label as a use for the drug. See 21
C.F.R. 201.56 (2000).
180. See Washington Legal Foundation, 13 F. Supp. 2d at 56 (citing Off-Label Drugs,
Reimbursement Policies Constrain Physicians in Their Choice of Cancer Therapies, GAO/
PEMD-91-14 at 4 (Sept. 1991)).
181. See id. (citing Deposition of William K. Hubbard, Associate Commissioner for Policy
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some circumstances constitutes the standard of medical care, in other
instances, such use has been harmful. 8 2 In an attempt to ensure that
public health is protected, the FDA promulgated guidelines limiting
the distribution of "enduring materials" (journal article reprints and
text books)'83 by a manufacturer and defining the permissible involve-
ment of drug companies in continuing medical education (CME)
seminars.'84 The District Court for the District of Columbia ruled
that these regulations violate commercial free speech. 8 ' In a subse-
quent opinion, the court held that the entire Food and Drug Adminis-
tration Modernization Act (FDAMA), which incorporated the above
guidance plus additional restrictions, also violated constitutionally
protected commercial speech rights.'86
The FDA filed an expedited appeal with the Disrict of Columbia
Circuit Court of Appeals. The FDA was expected to argue that no
other alternatives adequately address the government's substantial
interest in regulating off-label use.' 87 The court expected to hear "a
difficult constitutional question of considerable practical importance,"
but instead saw the dispute disappear "before [its] eyes. "188 At oral
argument, the government stated that neither FDAMA nor the CME
Guidance independently authorized the FDA to prohibit or sanction
speech.8 9 Instead, the FDA created a safe harbor for manufacturers,
ensuring that the FDA would not use FDAMA to independently
challenge the content of information about off-label use. 9 ° In other
words, the government agreed with the WLF that FDAMA did not
provide the FDA with authority to regulate a manufacturer's
speech.'
Coordination, at 59-61 (Mar. 21, 1996)).
182. See id. at 56-57. In the 1980s, physicians prescribed two antiarrythmic drugs to treat
minor disturbances in patients who recently had heart attacks. Taking these drugs in combina-
tion increased their risk of dying by two-and-one-half times. Id. at 56.
183. Advertising and Promotion; Guidance, 61 Fed. Reg. 52,800 (1996) (codified at 21
U.S.C. 360aaa-1 (1999)).
184. Final Guidance on Industry-Supported Scientific and Educational Activities, 62 Fed.
Reg. 64,093 (1997).
185. Washington Legal Foundation, 13 F. Supp. 2d at 56.
186. Washington Legal Foundation, 56 F. Supp. 2d at 87.
187. See WLF Ruling Offers No Viable Alternatives for Encouraging sNDAs-FDA Appeal,
THE PINK SHEET, FDA/F-D-C REPORTS, INC., Oct. 18, 1999, at 28.
188. Washington Legal Foundation v. Henney, 202 F.3d 331, 335 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
189. Id. at 335. The court noted that both parties' briefs "were quite confusing" regarding
the meaning of FDAMA and the CME Guidance. The FDA was asked to clarify its position at
oral argument because, at times, the FDA's brief shared the WLF's assessment that the FDA
had legal authorization to restrict a drug manufacturer's speech, but more frequently the govern-
ment asserted that compliance provided nothing more than a safe harbor. Id.
190. Id.
191. Id. at 336. The FDA does retain the prerogative to use as evidence questionable pro-
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If the FDA had not changed its stance and the court had decided
the constitutional issue in favor of WLF's position, the consequences
might have been more far-reaching than regulation of off-label use.
112
Possibly, the FDA's power to regulate all drug labeling could have
been restricted.193 The impact of such decisions on advertising might
also have limited the power of DDMAC, which protects against
"potentially misleading" speech. 94
Court challenges to the FDA's authority and the cumbersome
process of working through government bureaucracy potentially ham-
per the effectiveness of DDMAC to regulate prescription drug adver-
tising. 9  The FDA's mission to protect the health of citizens, as well
as the importance of getting safety information to consumers, would
likely ensure that risk information would not be removed from adver-
tisements. Nevertheless, if requirements for drug manufacturer
advertising become less stringent, defendant drug companies will have
little trouble showing compliance.
motional conduct related to a CME Guidance or FDAMA in a misbranding or "intended use"
enforcement action. Id.
192. One of the present consequences is that the position of the FDA is unclear, leaving
drug companies unsure of what can and cannot be said. One commentator believes that
[t]he decision returns an issue with significant First Amendment implications to the
caverns of informal, ad hoc FDA enforcement. By forcing potential speakers to guess
at future agency actions and motives, the decision threatens to 'chill' speech that
modern courts have striven mightily to protect.
Glenn C. Smith, Faint-Hearted 'Off-Label' Ruling, NATL. L. J., Mar. 20, 2000, at A21.
193. See FDA Bites Its "Free Speech" Bullet in Appeal of WLF Defeat, DICKINSON'S FDA
REVIEW, Aug. 1999, at 2. Former FDA counsel Peter Barton Hutt and William W. Vodra and
American University law professor Lewis Grossman commented that the decisions of the court
in WLF v. Friedman, WLF v. Henney, and in Pearson v. Shalala, 164 F.3d 650 (D.D.C. 1999)
(holding that FDA requirement that health claims be omitted from dietary supplement labels
violates constitutional free speech rights) would restrict labeling information about the effective-
ness of the drug. Vodra suggested that the "decisions could return FDA to pre-1962 days before
there was a drug-efficacy requirement." Id.
194. See id. at 3. At present DDMAC does not undertake a constitutional analysis of
advertisement content to determine if the advertisement is misleading speech. 21 C.F.R. §
202.1 (e)(5) and (e)(6) provide extensive criteria to determine what is false, lacking in fair balance,
or misleading.
195. Rather than pursue action through DDMAC, the drug company Zeneca lodged its
marketing complaints against Eli Lilly by filing a law suit, alleging Lanham Act violations.
Commenting on Zeneca's choice, attorney William Vodra observed that Zeneca obtained infor-
mation to support its claims through the legal process of discovery in less time than would be
required by DDMAC. Do Firms Need Courts to Protect Them from DDMAC Ineptness?, DICKIN-
SON'S FDA REVIEW, Aug. 1999, at 5.
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VI. ADVERTISING-ITS IMPACT
A. Advertising and the Learned Intermediary Rule
Advertising of prescription drugs has changed the relationship
among patients, physicians, and pharmaceutical companies. Some
commentators and courts advocate that allowing a drug company to
communicate directly to the consumer requires the company to
provide warnings directly to the patient and, if the warnings are inade-
quate, be directly liable to the consumer.' Advocates of an exception
to the learned intermediary rule believe that health care providers
should no longer shield manufacturers from direct liability.'97 Others
maintain that direct-to-consumer advertising should not create an
exception to the learned intermediary rule because health care provid-
ers are still required to write prescriptions.'98 Two recent court
decisions reflect these two opposing views.
1. In re Norplant and Perez v. Wyeth Laboratories
In In re Norplant'99 the court emphasized that the rationale for
the learned intermediary rule was to shield drug manufacturers from
liability when a properly trained physician prescribes a drug."' In this
way, the drug manufacturer is encouraged to make prescription drugs
available despite their potentially harmful side effects.2"' In contrast,
in Perez v. Wyeth Laboratories202 the court maintained that the
patient's interest in reliable information should predominate a policy
interest in insulating manufacturers from liability.2"3
Both lawsuits were brought by women claiming they were
injured by the contraceptive Norplant, which is sold by Wyeth Lab-
oratories, a subsidiary of American Home Products.2"4 In In re Nor-
196. See, e.g., Schwartz, supra note 3, at 845 (stating that the same legal principles that
apply to other product sellers should apply to drug manufacturers who advertise); Garside v.
Osco Drug, Inc., 764 F. Supp. 208, 211 n.4 (D. Mass. 1991), rev'd on other grounds, 976 F.2d 77,
80 (1st Cir. 1992) (noting that the decision may have been different if the manufacturer had
directly advertised to consumers); Doe v. Alpha Therapeutic Corp., 3 S.W.3d 404, 419 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1999), (stating without citation to any authority that advertising of a drug product provides
an exception to the learned intermediary rule).
197. Schwartz, supra note 3, at 842-45.
198. See generally Noah, supra note 3; Allen, supra note 3.
199. 165 F.3d 374 (1999).
200. Id. at 379.
201. Id.
202. 734 A.2d at 1245.
203. Id. at 1262.
204. In In re Norplant, five recipients of Norplant brought the first of three bellwether
suits, asserting that Wyeth violated the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act. 165 F.3d at 377.
In Perez, which also had five plaintiffs, the plaintiffs sought a determination of whether the
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plant, the plaintiffs argued that the learned intermediary rule should
not apply because Wyeth aggressively marketed Norplant.2 °5 How-
ever, the plaintiffs did not present any evidence that their decision to
use Norplant was influenced by advertisements. The Fifth Circuit
stated that even if evidence of such influence had been heard, as long
as a physician-patient relationship existed, the court would apply the
learned intermediary rule.2 °6 Thus, the court found that because Nor-
plant is a prescription drug and because minor outpatient surgery is
required for implantation, the physician actively participated in the
patients' health care decision. °7
In Perez, the New Jersey court maintained that the way of doing
business in the pharmaceutical industry has changed; therefore, the
underlying policies of the learned intermediary rule require reexami-
nation .2 8 The court summarized its view by asserting that a drug
company should not be relieved of a duty to provide proper warnings
of the dangers or side effects of a drug when it undertakes mass mar-
keting of the drug in order to influence a patient's choice, and when it
makes direct claims to consumers about the efficacy of its product.2 9
The Perez court declared that the policies supporting the learned
intermediary doctrine were less meaningful when drug manufacturers
advertised directly to the consumer.20  The court asserted that the
only policy that could justifiably support the rule was the need for a
physician to interpret complex medical information. 21  The court and
commentators suggest that advertising significantly disrupts the phys-
ician-patient relationship by allowing manufacturers to communicate
directly with the consumer through print and broadcast advertising.
2 12
The question becomes whether advertising disrupts the relationship to
such an extent that the physician's role in the patient's care has been
abrogated.
2. Advertising and the Patient-Physician Relationship
Advocates for creating an exception to the learned intermediary
rule contend that by advertising, a manufacturer affects the patient-
learned intermediary doctrine applied. The New Jersey Supreme Court did not decide Wyeth's
liability for plaintiffs' alleged injuries. 734 A.2d at 1248.
205. In re Norplant, 165 F.3d at 379.
206. Id.
207. Id.
208. Perez, 734 A.2d at 1247.
209. Id.
210. Id. at 1255-56. The court listed the policies as set out in Noah, supra note 3, at 157-
59.
211. Perez, 734 A.2d at 1256.
212. Id. at 1255-57.
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doctor relationship because it influences the patient to ask for, and
perhaps demand, a particular product."' In Perez, the court raised an
additional concern: that in the changing health care environment,
physicians have less time to spend with patients and, as a result, will
acquiesce more readily to patient demands. 214 Because physicians are
"inundated with information about various prescription drug prod-
ucts," their role may be limited when prescribing drugs.215
Even though direct-to-consumer advertising has interjected drug
manufacturers into the physician-patient relationship, physicians can-
not abdicate their role as healers. A physician has ethical and legal
obligations to provide the best care for his or her patients' health
needs. Bowing to a patient's insistence on a particular treatment can
ultimately lead to undesirable consequences. For example, physicians
often succumb to the demands of patients and parents of ill children to
prescribe antibiotics for the common cold.2"6 The over-prescription of
antibiotics has led, in part, to the emergence of bacteria resistant to
more common antibiotics, leaving physicians with fewer choices for
21treatment. 17 Patients should be their own best advocates for their
health care, but a physician should remain one of the best resources to
help evaluate information.
A correlation between direct-to-consumer advertising and dis-
ruption of the patient-doctor relationship has not been established.
However, if courts acquiesce to this unsubstantiated influence, the
result is destruction, not disruption, of the patient-doctor relationship.
Such reasoning becomes an excuse to hold manufacturers directly lia-
ble for injuries associated with prescription drugs, ultimately remov-
ing the physician's obligation to decide whether to prescribe a drug
213. See, e.g., Schwartz, supra note 3, at 843-44.
214. Perez, 734 A.2d at 1255 (citing Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Faulty Warning Labels Add to
Risk in Prescription Drugs, N.Y. TIMES, June 4, 1999, at A27). The court quoted the article: "In
a 1997 survey of 1,000 patients, the F.D.A. found that only one-third had received information
from their doctors about the dangerous side effects of drugs they were taking." Id.
215. Hill v. Searle Laboratories, 884 F.2d 1064, 1071 (8th Cir. 1989).
216. See, e.g., D.B. Jernigan et al., Minimizing the Impact of Drug-Resistant Streptococcus
Pneumoniae (DSRP), 275 J. AMER. MED. ASSOC. 206 (1996); A.C. Nyquist et al., Antibiotic Pre-
scribing for Children with Colds, Upper Respiratory Tract Infections, and Bronchitis, 279 J. AMER.
MED. ASSOC. 875 (1998).
217. See Nyquist et al. and Jernigan et al., supra note 217. See also L.F. McCaig and J.M.
Hughes, Trends in Antimicrobial Drug Prescribing Among Office-Based Physicians in the United
States, 279 J. AMER. MED. AssoC. 214 (1998). The common cold, caused by viruses, is not
affected by antibacterial agents. Exposure of a person's normal bacterial flora to antibiotics con-
tributes to increasing resistance of potential pathogens to commonly used antibiotics. Treating
diseases caused by bacteria that have become resistant to antibiotics requires that patients use
more expensive and potentially more toxic agents. The ultimate concern is that the antibiotics
currently available will be ineffective in the future.
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and to choose which drug to prescribe. The central role of the
physician in a patient's care cannot be forgotten or minimized.
Critics of the learned intermediary rule who advocate a manufac-
turer's direct liability to the patient do not maintain that a drug
manufacturer does not have a duty to warn the physician. 21' The
complexity of the material describing the risks and benefits of a partic-
ular drug becomes the most important rationale for retaining the
learned intermediary rule. The physician is the learned intermediary
because the physician has training, experience, and knowledge of the
patient, all of which are required for optimal care. 219  In Perez, the
court ultimately concluded, "neither the physician nor the manufac-
turer should be entirely relieved of their respective duties to warn. ,220
In this scenario, a plaintiff would bring both the physician and manu-
facturer into court, and the jury would determine the contribution of
each to the proximate cause of harm.221
The Perez court may be correct in its assessment of a jury's
ability to analyze different defendants' relative contribution to a plain-
tiffs harm, but the role of direct-to-consumer advertising in liability
should be viewed skeptically. The goal of advertising is to sell a prod-
uct,222 and this goal is not different when the product is a prescription
drug. Advertisements, even if balanced, do not constitute warnings.
Therefore, if a duty to warn was created merely by advertising, drug
manufacturers would need to develop additional means to fulfill that
duty. -For example, the FDA could expand its requirement that man-
ufacturers provide understandable written information to patients who
are prescribed products that are advertised. 223  Drug companies may
protest these additional costs; however, additional advertising may
result in increased sales. To determine whether a drug manufacturer
proximately caused an injury claimed by the plaintiff, the court would
first examine whether the advertisement presented a balance of risks
and benefits. The next question would be whether written product
218. See generally Noah, supra note 3, at 157-59.
219. See citations, supra note 37.
220. Perez, 734 A.2d at 1262-63.
221. The Perez court believed that this was a workable system. The pharmaceutical manu-
facturer could seek contribution, indemnity, or exoneration if the physician was negligent. " In
our experience, jurors are extremely skilled at sorting out the justly and legally responsible par-
ties." Id. at 1263. (citing Estate of Chin v. St. Barnabas Med'l Ctr., 734 A.2d 778 (N.J. 1999)).
222. See Jon D. Hansen & Douglas A. Kysar, Taking Behavioralism Seriously: Some Evi-
dence of Market Manipulation, 112 HARV. L. REV. 1420, 1427 (1999). "[M]anufacturers have
every incentive to utilize cognitive biases to lower consumer appreciation of product risks. Such
manipulation... is simply another form of cost externalization, a practice that manufacturers
naturally pursue in an effort to avoid costs and increase profit margins." Id.
223. Schwartz, supra note 3, at 847.
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information was provided to the patient. Ultimately, the adequacy of
the product insert would be decided. The majority of courts, how-
ever, has not found that providing a patient with a product insert
creates an exception to the learned intermediary rule.224 The minority
decisions have been disfavored, and an advertising exception may not
be recognized in those jurisdictions either. 221 If an extensive written
description of the risks and benefits of a drug is not accepted by courts
as adequate warning, a 30-60 second television spot, even if balanced,
certainly should not be either.
B. Marketing Truths
The practice of medicine in the United States is less paternalistic
than in the past because patient involvement in health care decisions
has increased.226 Patients have greater access to information, particu-
larly through the Internet, and also have more choices in the type of
health care sought, as alternative medicine becomes more acceptable to
insurance carriers in addition to traditional Western practice. Direct-
to-consumer advertising can be another source of inforhiation for con-
sumers who want to become advocates for their own health care.
Advertising, however, does influence consumers and cannot simply be
dismissed.227
Because health is critically important to consumers and their
families, the information in and presentation of health care product
advertisements has greater significance for consumers than the
contents of advertisements for hair care products or athletic shoes.
Commentators Jon Hansen and Douglas Kysar argue that consumers
are susceptible to manufacturer manipulation, which likely results in
the purchase of too many risky products. 228 They support their con-
224. See, e.g. Martin, 661 N.E.2d at 356; MacPherson, 775 F. Supp. at 425-26; Lacy, 567
A.2d at 401-02.
225. See, e.g., Martin, 661 N.E.2d at 243. The Reaves court disfavored the decisions in
Stephens and Odgers, cases where courts refused to apply the learned intermediary doctrine when
the drug was an oral contraceptive. Reaves, 765 F. Supp. at 1290. In Garside v. Osco Drug, Inc.,
976 F.2d 77, 80 (1st Cir. 1992), the court cited MacDonald as authority for the general applica-
bility of the learned intermediary rule even though the MacDonald court created an exception to
the rule. The holding of MacDonald was not discussed in Martin; therefore, whether the court
was minimizing the MacDonald decision as one that held an exception to the learned intermedi-
ary rule is not known.
226. See Perez, 734 A.2d at 1255.
227. See Hanson & Kysar, supra note 233, at 1429. Hanson and Kysar write that a "multi-
tude of nonrational factors influence individual decisionmaking, [and] consumers cannot be
expected to engage in efficient product purchasing analyses-regardless whether manufacturers
are required to supply product warnings." Id. at 1425. Pharmaceutical drug advertising, par-
ticularly advertising directed to physicians, is briefly discussed. Id. at 1455-59.
228. Id. at 1425. Hanson and Kysar argue their review of behavioral research and evidence
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clusion with an analysis of the influence that cigarette advertisements
have on consumers. 229 Through advertisements, tobacco companies
convinced the public that filter and low tar cigarettes were less harm-
ful than other cigarettes.230 Scientific analysis does not support that
contention.231
Drug manufacturers that have advertised on television have
reported an increase in sales.232 Whether patients requesting the drugs
are newly identified as having a particular condition that is treatable
with the medication or whether the sales represent patients who have
requested a switch in medications is not known. An important differ-
ence between the sale of cigarettes and the sale of pharmaceutical
products is that cigarette smokers can directly purchase any cigarette
they choose. Consumers targeted by pharmaceutical advertisements
need to have a physician prescribe the advertised drug.
Physicians complain that advertisements influence patients, who,
in turn, pressure physicians to prescribe the advertised drugs.233 An
often cited reference in the Annals of Internal Medicine stated that a
significant number of physicians do not support pharmaceutical
advertising. 234 At the same time, physicians themselves accept perks
and give-away items from drug companies.235 Possibly, the physicians
who responded to the Annals of Internal Medicine poll do not repre-
sent the same population of doctors who accept gratuities from drug
companies. The impact of televised drug advertising on physicians'
work, as well as on their attitudes about its benefits and drawbacks,
would be useful information for this debate.
VII. CONCLUSION
Neither case law precedent nor policy arguments support the
argument that direct-to-consumer advertising should create an excep-
tion to the learned intermediary rule in drug liability actions;
Washington courts should not recognize this exception. Historical
of market manipulation vindicates early advocates of product liability because manufacturers
exert "undue influence" over consumers. Id. at 1428.
229. Id. at 1467-1551.
230. Id. at 1473-75.
231. Id. at 1475.
232. See supra note 1.
233. See Terzian, supra note 3, at 157-58 and citations therein.
234. Martin S. Wilkes et al., Pharmaceutical Advertisements in Leading Medical Journals:
Expert's Assessments, 116 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 912 (1992). The scientific validity of this
survey has been questioned, but it has been widely reported in the popular press as well as in law
review articles. See Reeves, supra note 1, at 668.
235. See generally Susan Heilbrormer Fisher, Note, The Economic Wisdom of Regulating
Pharmaceutical "Freebies, " 1991 DUKE L.J. 206 (1991).
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exceptions to the learned intermediary rule do not provide sound legal
precedent for creating another exception based on direct-to-consumer
advertising. While some of the policy reasons for the rule are no
longer as valid as they were twenty years ago, an exception to the rule
would undermine the most critical policies. The importance of a
patient's interaction with a physician would be minimized if a drug
company were held directly liable when it advertises to consumers. A
physician has the skill, knowledge, experience, and ethical commit-
ment to provide the best care for patients.
The fundamental policies underlying tort law are to compensate
the injured individual and to deter the negligent party from not fulfill-
ing its duty of care.236 At first glance, making a drug manufacturer
directly liable to an injured user of the drug would promote compensa-
tion. Manufacturers could spread the cost of injury among those who
use the products. Pharmaceutical companies would argue, however,
that subjecting them to direct liability would increase the costs of
business so significantly that research and development of new thera-
peutics would suffer, resulting in fewer available treatments.
237
Another potential negative consequence to the patient is that drug
manufacturers may have less incentive to inform the physician of all
benefit and risk data, preventing the physician from providing neces-
sary information about a drug to the patient.
The physician's skill and experience contribute far more to
reducing injury than holding drug manufacturers directly liable for
"misleading" advertisements ever could. Advertisements are manipu-
lative; they are intended to be. Asking the courts to pretend otherwise
serves neither the patient nor the manufacturer. If consumers, physi-
cians, and the legal system believe that advertising by pharmaceutical
manufacturers creates additional risks for patients and burdens physi-
cians, the FDA guideline describing "help-seeking" advertisements or
"reminder" advertisements can supplant the "product claim" ads.238
While many of us might find advertisement of health care products
unseemly, that does not justify further confusing tort law in product
failure to warn cases by creating another exception to the learned
intermediary rule.
236. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 4, at 25.
237. See Allen, supra note 3, at 130-31. Allen discusses the near-crisis in the childhood
vaccine market. Because of potential litigation, the number of drug companies manufacturing
the diphtheria-tetanus-pertussis (DPT) vaccine decreased from eight manufacturers to two.
Without federal government intervention to create a pool of money to provide for injured vac-
cinees, all companies might have ceased vaccine production.
238. See Advertising and Promotion, 60 Fed. Reg. at 42,582 (2000).
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